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I. Introduction
“Thirty men with guns entered in the village.  Some of them found me in my house. Three 
of them raped me and I fell unconscious.  The men locked me inside my house (straw hut) 
and set it on fire. I managed to get out of the house through the burning grass” 1
—Anonymous, October 17, 2004, West Darfur
During the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, soldiers often concluded the rape of 
thousands of women by “sexual mutilat[ing] the vagina and pelvic area with machetes, 
sticks, boiling water, and in one case, acid.”2 As part of the ethnic conflict in Bosnia, 
soldiers selected women at random from overcrowded “detention centers,” and raped the 
women in front of other detainees or took them to a different location where they were
raped and brutally murdered.3  More recently, in Darfur, men wearing military uniforms
routinely kidnapped girls as young as thirteen in broad daylight, held them at knifepoint, 
and raped them in front of their peers.4
The last decade has witnessed some of the most sickening examples of wartime 
sexual violence in recent history.  In nearly all recent conflicts—including those in the 
former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, India (Kashmir), Rwanda, Sri Lanka, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), Angola, Sudan, Cote d’Ivoire, East Timor, Liberia, Algeria, 
the Russian Federation (Chechnya), and northern Uganda—combatants have used rape to 
1
 Medecins Sans Fronteirs, The Crushing Burden of Rape: Sexual Violence in Darfur, March 8, 2005.
2
 Human Rights Watch, Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence during the Rwandan Genocide and its Aftermath, 
September 1996, Introduction.
3
 Final Report of the Commission of Experts Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. 
SCOR, Annex 1, ¶ 248, U.N. Doc S/1994/674
4 See e.g. Medecins Sans Fronteirs, The Crushing Burden of Rape: Sexual Violence in Darfur, March 8, 
2005).
4“terrorize and control civilian populations.”5 While it is undisputed that sexual violence
has long been a part of ethnic warfare and armed conflict,6 a significant amount of 
evidence exists to suggest that it has increasingly begun to play a more central role in 
military combat and ethnic conflict. The abuse and victimization of innocent civilian 
women and girls is high on the agenda of many combatants during these times of 
violence.  
Increased media attention, the codification of laws preventing such violence, the 
rise of international war crimes tribunals and an increase in awareness concernin g 
violence against women has done little to reduce wartime rape.7  The continuing 
existence of such brutality indicates that the international community’s response has been 
largely ineffectual.  This note proposes that the solution lies not in punishing the soldiers
who commit such heinous acts, but in making it easier to convict the military leaders who 
allow the violence to flourish.  In some situations, it is apparent that military leaders have 
explicitly ordered their subordinates to commit rape and other forms of gender-based
violence as part of a national policy of ethnic cleansing.8  In other situations, soldiers may 
have perpetrated such crimes without the express consent of their superiors.  While the 
modern war crimes tribunals have made it somewhat easier to punish such commanders, 
the current legal standard adopted by these courts does not appear to be having a 
significant deterrent effect.  This note will contend that the continued occurrence of rape 
in times of war results in large part from the international community’s reluctance to 
5
 LaShawn R. Jefferson, In War as in Peace: Sexual Violence and Women’s Status, Human Rights Watch 
(2004), avaliable at http://hrw.org/wr2k4/15.htm.
6
  See e.g., SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN, AND RAPE (1975).
7
 Kelly D. Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape and Other Gender-Related Crimes under International Law: 
Extraordinary Advances, Enduring Obstacles, 21 BERKELY J. INT’L LAW 288, 297 (2003). 
8 See, e.g., Roy Guttman, Rape Camps: Evidence Serb Leaders in Bosnia Ok’d Attacks, Newsday, April 19, 
1993.
5punish high-level military officials who neither physically perpetrated the crime, were not 
present at the crime scene, and did not necessarily order rape.  
This note will explore the current controversy over the proper standard for 
punishing commanders whose subordinates have committed rape, and examine the 
interplay between the nature of rape, the underlying theories of command responsibility, 
and an international legal system that has failed to produce fruitful results.  Part I looks at 
the history of rape in times of war. Part II discusses the social science data available on
wartime rape, and focuses on how and why military operations have come to use sexual 
violence as a weapon of war. Part III explores the theories underlying the principle of 
command responsibility, and then compares and contrasts various legal results and
standards. 
Finally, Part IV argues that the International Criminal Court (the “ICC”) should 
return to a presumption of knowledge standard used by early war crimes tribunals for 
punishing commanders.  The note proposes a slight expansion of the presumption 
standard used by these early courts, whereby general, historical knowledge of rape would 
satisfy the mens rea requirement of command responsibility. In addition, the note will 
propose a series of measures that military officials can use to both deter the commission 
of rape by subordinates and rebut the knowledge presumption.  Finally, the note
examines how the ICC could use such a standard to punish commanders for the atrocities 
currently under investigation in Darfur.  The proposed standard will effectively punish
military leaders even when they did not directly participate in the rape, were not present 
at the crime scene, and did not specifically order the offense.  The adoption of this legal 
6standard should result in an overall reduction in the quantity of certain types of wartime 
rape.
II. The Nature of Rape in Armed Conflict
Rape has played a crucial role in war and armed conflict for centuries.9 Societies 
have tacitly accepted rape as an “unfortunate byproduct” of war since time immemorial.10
Even the Old Testament includes examples of such violence: “For I [God] will gather all 
the nations against Jerusalem to battle, and the city shall be taken and the houses looted 
and the women raped; half the city shall go into exile, but the rest of the people shall not 
be cut off from the city.”11 The Ancient Romans and Greeks, as well as other cultures
have recorded examples of wartime rape.12 It is not until recent times, however, that 
combatants have come to use rape as a tool of war.
A. History of Wartime Rape
In modern times, soldiers have committed the crime of rape in numerous conflicts
not well-known to modern audience s.  During World War I, for example, German 
soldiers habitually raped civilians in Belgium and France.13 Both Japan and Germany
used rape strategically during the Second World War, as did occupying Russian troops in 
Germany at the end of the war.14  However, the scale of rape and sexual violence appears 
to have expanded exponentially during the twentieth century.15  In the mid-1990’s, news 
reports highlighted the widespread and organized rape of Bosnian Muslim women by 
9 JUDITH G. GARDAM AND MICHELLE J. JARVIS, WOMEN, ARMED CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 
(2001).
10
 Catherine N. Niarchos, Women, War and Rape: Challenges Facing the International Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 649, 650 (1995).
11 Zechariah 14:2 (King James).
12 See Brownmiller, supra note 5, at 33-34. 
13
 Patricia Viseur Sellers and Kaouru Okuizumi, International Prosecution of Sexual Assaults, 7 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS 45, 46 (1997).
14 JAN JINDY PETTMAN, WORLDING WOMEN: A FEMINIST INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 101-115 (1994).
15
 Askin, supra note 6, at 297.
7Bosnian Serb military forces, as well as the campaign of sexual violence perpetrated by 
Hutu militia groups and the Rwandan Armed Forces against Tutsi women. Civilian rape
also played a key role during recent fighting in Bangladesh, Uganda, Myanmar, and 
Somalia,16 as well as various other conflicts not as well-reported by the mainstream press.  
It is undeniable that rape is nearly endemic in modern warfare.
B. Staggering Statistics
While it may be impossible to deduce an exact number, authorities have reported 
a mind-numbing amount of rapes in times of war. Experts approximate that soldiers 
raped between 250,000 and 400,000 women during the 9-month war for independence in 
Bangladesh in 1971.17 The United Nation estimates that during the 100-day Rwandan 
genocide of 1994, combatants raped between 250,000 and 500, 000 women and girls.18
In addition, “thousands women were individually raped, gang-raped, raped with objects,
such as sharpened sticks or gun barrels, held in sexual slavery, or sexually mutilated.”19
Many Rwandese women contracted the AIDS virus as a result of the rape, and are now 
dead or waiting to die.20
During the war in Bosnia, European Community figures suggest that enemy 
forces raped over 20,000 women, while the Sarajevo State Commission for Investigation 
of War Crimes estimates the number was closer to 50,000.21 Throughout the conflict,
16
  M.J Toole & RJ Waldman, Complex Emergencies: Refugee and Other Populations in The Public Health 
consequences of Disasters, 425 (Noji EK, ed.) (1997).
17 BROWNMILLER, supra note 5, at 79.
18
 Amnesty International, Women of Rwanda: Marked for Death, (April 7, 2004), available at 
http://web.amnesty.org/actforwomen/rwa-070404-action-eng.
19 Coalition for Women’s Humans Rights in Conflict Situations, Rwandan Rape Victims denied Justice by 
U.N. Tribunal, (March 10, 2003), available at http://www.womensrightscoalition.org/newsReleases/2003-
03-rwanda_en.php.
20 Id.
21
 Siobhan K. Fisher, Occupation of the Womb: Forced Impregnation as genocide, 46 DUKE LAW 
JOURNAL, 91, fn 4 (1996).
8soldiers raped women in their own homes, in brothels, and in various prison camps.22 In 
some of these “prison camps,” located in Brcko, Dboj, Foca, Gorazde, Kalinobik, 
Vesegrad, Keatern, Luka, Manjaca, Omarska and Tronopolje, soldiers used the barbaric 
practice of “forced impregnation,” to abuse the women.23  In the crime of forced 
impregnation a soldier rapes a woman with the goal of impregnating her.24  Once the 
woman is pregnant, the soldier holds in her captivity and forces her to carry the child to 
term.25
B. Darfur: the latest example
This note is particularly concerned with the allegations of mass rape in  the 
province of Darfur in western Sudan.  The United Nations Security Council has recently 
voted to refer this situation to ICC prosecutors.26  It is likely that the ICC will hear cases 
resulting from the conflict in the near future.  Authorities have accused Sudanese forces 
and government-backed Arab militias called the “Janjaweed” of using systematic rape, 
murder, and forcible depopulation against the villages of black Africans in the Darfur 
region since at least May of 2003.27  These militia and government forces have engaged 
in a “widespread and systematic campaign” of rape and violence against women of the 
African Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa ethnic groups.28
22 BEVERLY ALLEN, RAPE WARFARE: THE HIDDEN GENOCIDE IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA AND CROATIA
(1996).
23
 Inge Skejlsbaek, Sexual Violence and War: Mapping Out a Complex Relationship, 7 EUR. J. OF INT’L 
REL., 211, 220 (2001). 
24
 Spyros A. Sofos, Inter-Ethnic Violence and Gendered Constructions of Ethnicity in Former Yugoslavia, 
2 SOC. IDENTIES 73, 86 (1996).
25 See id.
26
 Human Rights Watch, ICC Takes Step to Bring Justice to Darfur: Khartoum Should Cooperate with the 
International Criminal Court, (June 6, 2005), available at 
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/06/06/sudan11076.htm.
27
 Nicholas D. Kristof, A Policy of Rape, N.Y.TIMES, June 5, 2005, at C2.
28
 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations-Secretary-General, 
January 25, 2005, pg. 3, available at http: www.un.org/News?dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf
9The reports of rape and other forms of sexual violence are horrific and outraging.  
Militia have raped and brutalized tens of thousands of women and girls.29  In a single 
attack near the village of Tawila, troops raped more than one hundred women; six of 
whom they raped and killed in front of their own fathers.30  While the motive behind the 
attacks—ethnic cleansing—appears to be similar in character to that of the 1994 conflict 
in Rwanda,31 “[r]ape appears to be a feature of most attacks in Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa 
areas of Darfur.”32 This outbreak of violence indicates that the legal standard adopted by 
the existing war crimes tribunals to punish and deter this violence has been inadequate.
Given this apparent expansion of sexual violence, it is increasingly important that the 
ICC find novel methods of punishing, deterring, and preventing such heinous acts of 
gender-based violence. 
C. Rape as a Tool of War
During World War I civilian casualties accounted for approximately 5% of
deaths, by 1990 that proportion had risen to 90%.33 The focus of war has traditionally 
been to overpower the opponent’s forces, in recent years, however, troops have used rape 
as part of the fighting itself. Acts of sexual violence are increasingly committed 
“systematically and strategically, such that sexual violence forms a central and 
fundamental part of the attack.”34 It is undisputed that soldiers have always used rape to 
29
 Georgette Gagnon and Brenda Dinnick, Sudan: Words are Not Enough, Human Rights Watch, available 
at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/06/11/sudan8812.htm, (last visited January 1, 2006).
30
 BBC News, Mass rape atrocity in West Sudan,(March 19, 2004) available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3549325.stm. (last visited January 1, 2006).
31 See id. 
32 Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic Cleansing by Government and Militia Forces in Western Sudan, 16 Human 
Rights Watch, 1, 33 (2004). [herinafter Darfur Destroyed]
33 RUTH L. SIVARD, WORLD MILITARY AND SOCIAL EXPENDITURES, (World Priorities Inc. 14th ed. 1991).
34
 Askin, supra note 6, at 297.
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abuse women during times of war.35  It should come as no surprise that recorded 
examples of wartime rape date back to Ancient Greece.36  In ancient times, however, the 
conquerors would typically rape women after they had won the battle as a means of 
celebration.37  This does not appear to be the case in current-day conflicts.  
With increasing frequency, since at least the early twentieth-century, rape has 
become part of the attack itself in many global conflicts.  One author, who has examined 
the problem in depth, has written that: 
[r]ape was a weapon of terror as the German Hun marched through 
Belgium in World War I; gang rape was part of the orchestrated riots of 
Kristallnacht which marked the beginning of Nazi campaigns against the Jews.  It 
was a weapon of revenge as the Russian Army marched to Berlin in World War 
II, it was used when the Japanese raped Chinese women in the city of Nanking, 
when the Pakistani Army battled Bangladesh, and when the American GI’s made 
rape in Vietnam a ‘standard operating procedure aimed at terrorizing the 
population into submission’”38
Antony Beevor’s book documenting rape by Russian soldiers suggests that during th e 
final months of World War II “in response to the vast scale of casualties inflicted on them 
by the Germans, the Soviets responded in kind and that included rape on a vast scale…in 
many towns and villages every female from age 10 to 80 was raped.”39  Interestingly, 
these Russian soldiers began their campaign of rape while the war was ending with the 
justification that the women were “sex-starved” and enjoyed such violence.40 The Soviet 
situation, however, is quite different from  modern campaigns in which combatants use 
35
 National Organization for Women, Viewpoint: Armies at War use Rape as a Weapon, available at
http://www.now.org/nnt/fall-99/viewpoint.html (“Marauding armies have always used rape as a means of 
controlling the minds and bodies of those they sought to conquer.”).
36 See e.g., BROWNMILLER, supra note 5.
37 See Heather A. Blackburn and Stacey M. Thomas, Rape Warfare, (Feb. 25, 1998), available at
http://jrscience.wcp.muohio.edu/Research/HNatureProposalsArticles/RapeWarfare.html.
38
 Maria B. Olujic, Women, Rape, and War: The Continued Trauma of Refugees and Displaced persons in 
Croatia, 13 ANTHROPOLOGY OF E. EUR. REV., Spring 1995.
39
 Peter Almond, Feature: book on World War II rapes upsets Russians, at
http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/6043-11.cfm.
40 ANTONY BEEVOR, THE FALL OF BERLIN 1945, 31 (2002).
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rape not as a personal reward, but as a strategy to cripple the enemy.  Rape has become a 
way to frighten and intimidate the opponent into submission,41 and in cases of ethnic 
genocide, to destroy the enemy’s race, sometimes through the heinous practice of forced 
impregnation.42
Scholars have postulated various theories to explain the recent phenomenon of 
wartime rape.  One author has observed that rape in times of war is the inevitable result 
of rape in times of peace, but that the scale of horror is vastly different.43  Rape during 
times of armed conflict follows specific patterns.44  It does not appear to occur randomly 
or haphazardly: “There is an ominous repetition in the stories of war rape and sexual 
torture internationally.  The same techniques and scenarios recur, from Mozambique to El 
Salvador to the Philippines.”45
Some theorists have posited that rape be classified as “asymmetric” warfare, 
which focuses less on gaining territory and more on inflicting trauma on the victim.46
The enemy soldier attacks a civilian woman, only indirectly with the aim of occupying a 
territory: “[t]he prime aim of war rape is to inflict trauma and thus to destroy family ties 
and group solidarity within the enemy group.”47 Rape results from a dehumanization of 
enemy women and allows the combatant to conceptualize the opponent as a foreign 
“other,” instead of as a human being.48  This “enemy dehumanization” subsumes morality 
41 See e.g., Claudia Card, Rape as a Weapon of War 11 HYPATIA: A J. OF FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY 223, 223 
(1996).
42
 Todd A. Salzaman, Rape Camps as a Means of Ethnic Cleansing: Religious, Cultural, and Ethical 
Responses to Rape Victims in the Former Yugoslavia, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 348, 359. (1998).
43
 Catherine A. Mackinnon, Rape, Genocide, and Women’s Human Rights, in MASS RAPE: THE WAR 
AGAINST WOMEN IN BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA 54, 55 (Alexandra Stigmayer ed. & Marion Faber trans., 1994).
44 PETTMAN, supra note 14, at 102.
45 Id.
46 See Bulent Diken, Becoming Abject: Rape as a Weapon of War, 11 BODY & SOC’Y. 111, 111 (2005).
47 Id. at 112.
48
 Viewpoint, supra note 33.
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and common decency in times of war and allows the “combatant…to destroy human life 
in the name of protecting the security of the motherland”.49 Thus, while a soldier might 
consider rape immoral during times of peace, it becomes perfectly acceptable to rape 
enemy women during times of war.
Other social scientists have asserted that a cult of masculinity accounts for the 
high incidence of wartime rape: “[t]he invasion of women’s bodies is another 
consequence of the masculine privilege that extends from this warfare. 50  But, instead of 
death, “it leaves behind a permanent legacy of suffering and sense of failure long after the 
battlefields have quieted.”51  A cult of virility is well-known among combatants to make 
them feel stronger, and the enemy weaker.52  Military training also frequently “creates a 
link between sexuality and violence.  Very consciously, the association between sexual 
potency, the penis and the gun is encouraged. It is well- known that in dictatorships the 
idea is systematically propagated that women belong to one of two groups: on the one 
hand, mothers of the homeland who must be respected, and on the other, whores.”53  As 
such, young male recruits may feel it is warranted and, in fact, necessary to sexually 
abuse these “whores.”
Clearly rape has become more than a deplorable side-effect of war, and has 
become a weapon of war.  Whether due to a cult of masculinity, the perception that rape 
is an easy way to dominate the enemy, or the belief that rape can destroy the enemy’s 
race, many soldiers appear to believe this type of violence is acceptable in modern 
49 Id.
50 See e.g., JEAN JACQUES FRESARD, THE ROOTS OF BEHAVIOUR IN WAR: A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE 47 
(2004).
51
 Viewpoint, supra note 33.
52 ROOTS, supra note 45.
53 Id. at 47 (citing Boppel, Pourquoi les hommes torturent, Amnesty International, May 1993, quoted by 
Eric David.).
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warfare.  Accordingly, the international legal system must act to alter these perceptions 
before more women suffer the same fate.
III. The Doctrine of Command Responsibility
The notion that commanders have a duty to control the actions of their 
subordinates has existed for centuries.54  During the twentieth century, various legal 
bodies began to formally recognize the concept as a theory for liability.55  In general, the 
doctrine holds that leaders may incur responsibility for failing to halt, prevent, or punish
the commission of crimes by subordinates.56 This section examines the way different 
courts have interpreted the doctrine’s mens rea requirement.  
A. Wartime leaders and Rape
Military commanders hold an extremely powerful position in the chain of army 
command.  They have the power to give orders, control the actions of their troops, and set 
the overall tone for the military operation. In her book, Against Our Will, Susan 
Brownmiller argues that wartime leaders have long accepted the inevitability of rape in 
times of war.57  She quotes General Patton as saying: “I then told him that, in spite of my 
most diligent efforts, there would unquestionably be some raping, and that I should like 
to have the details as early as possible so that the offenders could be properly hanged.”58
Likewise, in Russia, towards the end of World War II, Stalin is reported to have accepted 
and even condoned the rape of Polish and Russian women after they were liberated from 
54 See. e.g., Stuart E. Hendin, Command Responsibility and Superior Orders in the Twentieth Century: A 
Century of Evolution, 10 MURDOCH UNIVERSITY ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF LAW, (2003). 
55 See id.
56
 Andrew D. Mitchell, Failure to Halt, Prevent, or Punish: The Doctrine of Command Responsibility for 
War Crimes, 22 SYDNEY L. REV. 381, 388 (2000).
57 BROWNMILLER, supra note 5, at 31.
58 Id.
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various concentration camps.59  In his novel, The Downfall of Berlin, Beevor asserts that 
Stalin responded to a Yugoslavian leader who was complaining about the rape of
Russian, Croatian and Hungarian women by Soviet troops by asking: “[c] an’t he 
understand it if a soldier has crossed thousands of kilometers through blood and fir and 
death has fun with some women or takes a trifle?”60
The situation was different during the recent conflict in Bosnia, in which Bosnian 
Serb Commanders claimed that the rape of Muslim women was “good for raising fighter 
morale.”61 In Bosnia, military leaders appeared to be aware of, and even encouraged, the 
abuses perpetrated by their subordinates.  This note, however, focuses on situations
where commanders did not necessarily order rape, but allowed it to occur whether due to 
apathy or a feeling that rape may be an acceptable tool of war. Given that the 
phenomenon is so visible in the modern world, it is nearly impossible to conclude that a 
leader could be unaware of the problem.  This note will propose a method of holding 
these military leaders liable for the crimes of their subordinates based on the notion that 
they must be aware of the high risk of rape in these situations. 
B. History of Command Responsibility
Although the concept of command responsibility has attained greater notoriety as 
of late, the concept is not a novel one:  In the 4th century BC, Sun Tzu, the famous 
Chinese military strategist and general, acknowledged that military leaders should be 
responsible for the control of their troops.62  In 1439, Charles VII of France articulated 
59
 Almond, supra note 37.
60
. Id.
61
 William M. Walker, Making Rapists Pay: Lessons from the Bosnian Civil War, 12 ST. JOHN’S J.L. 
COMM., (1997) 449, 452.
62
 Michal Stryszak, Command Responsibility: How much Should a Commander be Expected to Know, 11 
U.S. AIR FORCE J. OF LEGAL STUD. 27, 28 (2002).
15
that all “French capatains or lieutenants would be liable for abuses, ills, and offenses 
occurring through his subordinates in cases where such leaders failed to take action or 
covered up the misdeed.”63 The doctrine has appeared sporadically throughout history at 
other times.  Approximately two hundred years after Sun Tzu’s death, the Swedish King, 
Gustavo’s Adolphus, ordered that: “No Colonel or Capitaine shall command his soldiers 
to doe any unlawful thing: which who so does, shall be punished according to the 
discretion of the Judges.”64 While not formally titled “command responsibility,” it is 
readily apparent that this notion has existed for centuries.
In modern times, during the period immediately following World War I, there was 
a general feeling that the law should hold military commanders liable for the actions of 
those under their command.65 During The Hague Conventions IV (1907) and X (1907), 
various countries came together to officially recognize the doctrine for the first time.66
The statutes of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals did not specifically include a 
provision on command responsibility, but developed such a form of punishment 
nonetheless in their jurisprudence due to a general feeling that the law should hold 
leaders accountable for the crimes of subordinates.67 The Military Tribunal in 
Nuremberg was concerned only with direct liability of high-level Nazi officials, while the 
Military Tribunal in Tokyo convicted both civilian and military people for failing to 
punish or prevent atrocities.68
63
 Hendin, supra note 54.
64 William H. Parks, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 MIL. L. REV. 1,4 (1973).
65
 Ilias Bantekas, The Contemporary Law of Superior Responsibility, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 573 (1999) 
(suggesting that this might have been a result of World War I’s high casualty rate).
66 Id.; see also Ann Ching, Evolution of the Command Responsibility in Light of the Celebici Decision of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 25 N. C. J.INT’L L. AND COM. REG. 167, 
177 (1999).
67 Id.
68
 Bantekas, supra note 64, at 573.
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The doctrine experienced a decline in popular status immediately following 
World War II, and was not included in the Geneva Convention of 1949.69  It languished 
for a period of over thirty years following the Geneva Conventions.70  During this period,
national forums were reluctant to punish commanders for the actions of their 
subordinates.71 The end of the twentieth century, however, witnessed a rebirth in the use 
of command responsibility, in part due to the emergence of the war crime tribunals at the 
end of the last century.72  The principle appears in both article 7(3) of the Statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (the “ICTY”) and Article 6(3) 
of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (the “ICTR”).  Prior to 
the ICTY’s Celebici73 decision, however, both tribunals only prosecuted commanders for 
direct participation, because it was easier to convict the accused under such an 
interpretation.74 The inclusion of command responsibility in Article 28 of the ICC’s 
Rome Statute signifies its reemerging influence in international law.
C. The Doctrine
The legal theory of command responsibility is “predicated upon the power of the 
superior to control the acts of his subordinates.”75 In its modern form, the principle of 
command responsibility maintains that c ourts may hold civilian and military officials 
vicariously liable for the crimes of a subordinate.76 Command responsibility is society’s 
69 Id. at 574.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72
 Mitchell, supra note 53, at 388.
73
 Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No.IT-96-21-T, Judgment, (Nov., 16 1998) [hereinafter Celebici].
74
 Bantekas, supra note 64, at 575.
75 Stryszak, supra note 54, at 376.
76 See e.g. Mathew Lippman, Humanitarian Law: The Uncertain Contours of Command Responsibility, 9 
TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1,  (2001) (“The doctrine of command responsibility imposes a duty on military 
commanders and civilian officials to ensure that subordinate troops adhere to the requirements of the law of 
war”).
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“last line of defense against war crimes.”77 Typically, the doctrine applies when a 
subordinate has committed a heinous act, such as killing a civilian or torturing an 
innocent. Command responsibility emerges from the notion that commanders have 
immense power over their subordinates.78  Just as commanders can lead their army to 
greatness, they also have the power to persuade subordinates to engage in atrocious acts 
to accomplish these goals.79  Because activities unacceptable in peacetime (i.e., killing) 
become acceptable in times of war, a young soldier may desensitize certain forms of 
violence.80  Commanding officers may begin to act as a soldier’s surrogate “conscience,”
enabling the troop to commit various abuses.81 Although the principle originated in
military law, it now also includes the responsibility of civil authorities for abuses 
committed by persons under their direct authority.82
In general, there are two forms of command responsibility. The first is direct 
responsibility for instructions that are patently illegal, such as when a military official 
officially authorizes the killing or rape of civil ians.83  The second is imputed 
responsibility for situations in which a superior had actual or “constructive” notice of a 
subordinate’s illicit actions.84  This imputed responsibility hinges on whether or not the 
superior had actual or constructive notice of the crimes and was in a position to stop 
77
  Major Michael L. Smidt, Yamashita, Medina & Beyond: Command Responsibility in Contemporary 
Military Operations, 164 MIL L. REV. 155, 165-6. (YEAR)
78 Id.
79 Id. at 158.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 See Major-General A.P.V. Rogers, Command Responsibility Under the Law of War, lecture given at the 
Lauterpracht Research Center for International Law, Cambridge University: (1999), available at 
http://www.law.cam.ac.uk./RCIL/Archive.html. This note, however, will focus on its application to military 
leaders only.
83
 Human Rights Watch, A Face and a Name: Civilian Victims of Insurgent Groups in Iraq, 17 HUM. RTS.
WATCH 1, 29. (2005).
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them.85  This note is concerned primarily with  the second form of command 
responsibility which holds that a comma nder can incur liability for his subordinates’ 
actions if he failed to take appropriate measures to control the subordinate, prevent the
crime, or punish the offending soldier.86
D. Actus Reus Requirement
Although the doctrine can take several forms, it typically consists of two non-
mental elements: (i) a superior-subordinate relationship and a chain of command; and (ii) 
failure by the superior to halt, prevent, or punish the subordinate.87. The key to 
establishing a superior-subordinate relationship lies in establishing that a person is in a 
position of authority or control over another person.88 Legal analysts generally accept
that this authority can be either de jure or de facto.89 That is, the authority must be either
formally vested by an official office (de jure), or evidence must show that a person has 
assumed a position of authority over another person or persons (de facto).90 In either 
case, the court will look to factors such as the degree of direction, power, and restraint 
that one person has exerted over another.91 Such authority may arise at any point along 
the chain of command.92
 Regardless of the type of authority, there must be evidence that the superior 
exercised “effective control” over the subordinate,  such that he was in a position prevent 
85 See id.
86 See generally Stryszak, supra note 52.
87 Celebici, Case No.IT-96-21-T at 346.
88
 Bantakas, supra note 64, at 578.
89 Id. at 578-9; 
90
 M. Lippman, The Evolution and Scope of Command Responsibility, 13 LEIDEN J. OF INT’L L., 131, 159 
(2000).
91
 Mitchell, supra note 60, at 384 (2000).
92 Id.
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the subordinate from committing the crime. 93  In Celebici, the ICTY examined the issue 
of superior responsibility for crimes that had been committed against Bosnian Muslims in 
the Foca prison camp. The ICTY defined the concept of “effective control” as the 
superior having “the material ability to prevent and punish the commission of” violations 
of international law.94  The Court also held that:
A duty is placed upon the superior to exercise this power so as to prevent 
and repress the crimes committed by subordinates…It follows that there is 
a  threshold at which persons cease to possess the necessary powers of 
control over the actual perpetrators of offense and, accordingly, cannot properly 
be considered their “superiors”…[G]reat care must be taken lest an injustice be 
committed in holding individuals responsible for the acts of others in situations 
where the link of control is absent or too remote.95
The second non-mental element requires that the superior neglected to act in some 
material way.  Typically, this means that the superior failed to prevent the crime or 
punish the person committing the offense.96  Courts have interpreted this element to mean 
that superiors have a “duty to prevent, punish, and control the commission of crimes by 
subordinates.”97  In Celebici, the Court held one of the accused commanders criminally 
liable merely because he had failed to act to stop the war crimes occurring at his camp:  
This is a case in which the Accused chose to bury his head in the sand and 
to ignore the responsibilities and power which he had as warden… he aided and 
abetted in the commission of these crimes, in that he was aware that these crimes 
were being carried out, and that, by his failure to take any action as warden in 
relation to these crimes, he knowingly contributed in a substantial way to the 
continued maintenance of those offenses by encouragement to those who carried 
them out.”98
93
 Jamie A. Williamson, Command Responsibility in the Case Law of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda, 14 CRIM. L. F. 365, 368 (2002).
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 Celebici, Case No.IT-96-21-T ¶ 378.
95 Id. 377.
96 See e.g. Mitchell, supra note 60, at  386
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Accordingly, it is incumbent upon commanders to either prevent these actions or actively 
punish the subordinate who has committed the crime. 
E. Mens Rea Requirement
While the major non-mental elements of the crime have remained consistent over 
time, the mens rea standard has been the subject of controversy.  In general, two 
standards of knowledge have emerged in international jurisprudence.  Article 28 of the 
ICC’s Rome Statute reflects these two standards.  It holds that a “military commander or 
person” may incur liability when he “either knew” or “should have known” that 
subordinates had committed or were about to commit a crime.  The standard is either one 
of negligence (“should have known”) or of actual knowledge (“knew”).  Some courts 
have used the negligence approach.  For example, in the Hostage Case ,99 the defendant 
military leaders were convicted for allowing subordinates to execute civilians in 
retaliation for attacks on German forces in the Balkans. Here, the tribunal held that a
commander could incur liability simply by ignoring or failing to seek out material 
information and that the accused could not use ignorance as a defense.100  Liability
essentially rested on the defendant’s inaction in the face of blatant and widespread 
atrocities.101
Other Courts have held that only actual knowledge will satisfy the mens rea 
requirement.  Under the actual knowledge standard, the prosecution must bring to light 
some affirmative evidence of the commander’s mental state. In the High Command102
99
 United States v. List, 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 759, 1230 (1951) [hereinafter Hostage Case].
100 Hostage, 1271.
101 See e.g., Bentakas, supra note 64, at 
102
 United States v. Von Leeb 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY 
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 1, 462 (1950). [hereinafter High Command]  In this 
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case, for example, the Court convicted high-ranking German military officials for 
allowing subordinates to carry out Hitler’s extermination program.  103  The main 
defendant argued that he was unaware of the crimes committed by his subordinates.104
The Court held that in order to incur liability “the occupying commander must have 
knowledge of [the] offenses and acquiesce or participate or criminally neglect to interfere 
in their commission.”105 . Proof of knowledge was essential because “it must be accepted 
that certain details of activities within the sphere of his subordinates would not be 
brought to his attention.”106  Here, the mere existence of the widespread crimes would not
satisfy the mens rea requirement.  These two standards of mens rea have competed for 
acceptance in international jurisprudence. 
II. Returning to an Old Standard: Presumption of Knowledge & Yamashita
Following World War II, the Yamashita107 case articulated a new standard for the 
knowledge requirement necessary to establish command responsibility.  In this case, the 
Court imputed liability to General Yamashita merely because the crimes had occurred 
and Yamashita must have known about them.108  In order to effectively deter rape, it is 
case, high-level German commanders were charged with liability for the crimes of their subordinates, who 
had helped carry out Hitler’s extermination program by killing communists and other civilians.
103 Id. at 545.
104 Id. at 547.
105 Christopher Crowe, Command Responsibility in the Former Yugoslavia: The Chances for Successful
Prosecution, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 191, 215 (1994).
106High Command, supra note 92, at 555.
107
 Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, 4 LAW REPORTS 
OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, 1, 88 (1945). [hereinafter Yamashita].
108 See e.g., Ann Marie Prevost, Race and War Crimes:The 1945 War Crimes Trial of General Tomoyuki 
Yamashita, 14 HUM. RTS. Q.  303, 328 (2002)
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necessary that Courts use an expanded version of this older standard which would allow
general, historical knowledge of wartime rape to satisfy the mens rea requirement.
A. The Yamashita standard
Yamashita is the seminal case for the international recognition of command 
responsibility as a basis for criminal responsibility.  General Tomoyuki Yamashita was 
the commanding general of the Fourteenth Army Group of the Imperial Japanese Army 
in the Philippines during the Second World War.109 Japanese soldiers murdered 
thousands of civilians, and raped more than five hundred women in the areas of the 
Philippines under Yamashita’s control.110 Authorities charged Yamashita as having 
“unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his duty as commander to control the
operations of the members of his command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities 
and other high crimes.”111  The prosecution acknowledged that there was little precedent 
for imposing command responsibility, but pointed to the fact that a number of 
international conventions supported the doctrine.112
The goal of the Prosecution was to establish that the widespread nature of the 
atrocities was so pervasive that Yamashita must have known they were occurring.113 The 
fact that Yamashita had not properly inspected his troops troubled the Commission 114 It
agreed that the widespread nature of the crimes indicated that the military leader  had 
109
 Robert Smith, THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC: TRIUMPH IN THE PHILIPPINES, 58 (1983).
110 RICHARD LAEL, THE YAMASHITA PRECEDENT: WAR CRIMES AND COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY, 140 
(1982); See also Bantekas, supra note 58, at 585. 
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either secretly ordered the crimes or tacitly allowed them to occur.115 The Commission 
ultimately found Yamashita guilty and sentenced him to death.116
In reviewing the case as a habeas petition, the United States Supreme Court 
concurred that “the crimes were so widespread…they must either have been willfully 
permitted by the accused, or secretly ordered by the accused.”117  Under the Yamashita
standard, a commander could incur liability by the mere fact that the acts of violence had 
occurred, even when the Prosecution could not directly prove that the com mander was 
aware of this. The mere existence of widespread violence in the specific circumstance 
satisfied the knowledge requirement.  Other legal bodies have since adopted a similar 
standard.118
In denying relief to Yamashita, the Supreme Court held that military commanders 
have an “affirmative duty to take such measures as [are] within his power and appropriate 
in the circumstances to protect prisoners of war and the civilian population.”119 This note 
will propose a similar, but expanded, standard for approaching command responsibility in 
situations of mass rape and argue for the imposition of an expanded commander duty 
using the Court’s language in Yamashita as precedent .  
115 Yamashita, supra note 87, at 35.
116 See Lael, supra note 85, at 95.
117
 Lietenant Commander Weston D. Burnett, Commmand Responsibility and a Case Study of the Criminal 
Responsibility of Israeli Military Commanders for the Pogram at Shatila and Sabra, 107 Mil. L. Rev. 71, 
95 (1985).
118 Bentakas, supra note 58, at 588. Article 10(4) of the Canadian War Crimes Regulation, whereby crimes 
committed by troops were prima facie evidence of liability.  In addition, the Supreme Court, in the High 
Command case used a similar standard. 
119 In re Yamashita, 327 US 1,16 (1946) . It also agreed with the Commission’s holding that: “’a series of 
atrocities and other high crimes have been committed by members of the Japanese armed forces” under 
command of petitioner “against people of the United States, their allies and dependencies…; that they were 
not sporadic in nature but in many cases were methodically supervised by Japanese officers and 
noncommissioned officers”; (2) that during the period in question petitioner “failed to provide effective 
control of… [his] troops, as was required by the circumstances.”  The Commission said: “…where murder 
and rape and vicious, revengeful actions are widespread offenses, and there is no effective attempt by a 
commander to discover and control the criminal acts such a commander may be held responsible, for the 
lawless acts of his troops, depending on their nature and the circumstances surrounding them.
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B. Customary International Law & Yamashita
Legal scholars are presently conflicted over whether or not customary 
international law has accepted the presumption of knowledge standard articulated by the
Yamashita Court.  Some international scholars, as well as the ICTY, have rejected the 
Yamashita test. In Celebici, the ICTY expressly denied the existence of any such rule of 
presumed knowledge “where the crimes of subordinates are a matter of public notoriety, 
are numerous, occur over a prolonged period, or over a wide geographical area.”120  The 
Court indicated that the knowledge requirement articulated by the Yamashita
Commission was unclear, and that neither Yamashita, nor High Command implied any 
such presumption of knowledge rule.121  Accordingly, the ICTY has held that the 
prosecution must establish knowledge through circumstantial or direct evidence of the 
subordinate’s crimes.122  The Court would not assume knowledge merely because the 
crimes had occurred.123 Some legal scholars have reached a similar conclusion.124
Command Responsibility expert Ilias Bantekas, has suggested that although “[a]rticle 
28(1)(a) of the ICC Statute, the explicit reference in the ICRC Commentary, and the 
unambiguous post-World War II case law” suggest that customary international law has 
accepted a presumption of knowledge standard, it would be premature to conclude that it 
120 Celebici, Case No.IT-96-21-T ¶ 384.
121 Id. ¶ 385
122 Celebici, Case No.IT-96-21-T ¶ 395.
123 Id. ¶ 386.
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rejection of the ‘should have known standard proposed by the United States signals that the Yamashita 
precedent may not carry any weight in the international community…Even in United States courts, 
Yamashita has lost favor. If it ever stood for a strict liability standard, that strict standard has never been 
enforced again. The protocol I standard is probably the best indication of what the international community 
would find acceptable, and that standard rejects any strict liability.  Comparing the Protocol I standard with 
that established by the United Nations Security Council in creating the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia, the two appear to be quite similair). 
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has become a norm of customary international law.125 Other scholars, however, have 
suggested that the Yamashita’s presumption of knowledge standard is an accepted norm 
of Customary International Law. Military expert and scholar, Michael Smidt, has argued 
that the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law and the treaties and Statutes of the 
international tribunals have adopted the Yamashita test. 126
A. Why an expanded Yamashita test is preferable
Although the standard adopted by customary international law remains unclear, 
the presumption of knowledge standard is appropriate and more useful in the deterrence 
of rape than a standard requiring proof of commander awareness.  Because wartime rape 
is so prevalent in the modern world, it is contrary to logic and evidence to conclude that a 
commander could be unaware of the risk.  Commanders may be unaware of a particular 
rape or series of rape, but they must realize that it is highly likely that their troops will 
commit such a crime.  Given this reality, I disagree with the ICTY’s interpretation of the 
mens rea requirement for command responsibility.  The Court’s assertion that Yamashita
does not suggest that a presumption of knowledge is part of customary international law 
also appears unfounded.  In fact, both cases do appear to suggest that the customary 
international law had accepted the standard at the time. 
The deterrence of future crimes underlies much of the theory behind the creation 
of the international war tribunals,127 but these courts have been ineffective in preventing 
wartime sexual violence.  The ICTY’s standard, requiring evidence of knowledge has not
125
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deterred rape.  The Court decided Celebici in the late 1990’s, but wartime rape continues 
to rage unabated throughout the globe.  As this note will discuss later, the Celebici
standard makes it too easy for commanders to aid a covert national policy of rape and 
avoid liability by hiding their knowledge.  Evidence and logic dictate that co mmanders 
know their soldiers will likely engage in some form of rape; hence, commanders have a 
responsibility to deter such crimes.  The adoption of a presumption of knowledge 
standard would both acknowledge this reality and heighten the duty requirement on 
commanders to prevent rape.  Under such a standard, military leaders could not sit by 
idly while their troops commit horrendous acts of sexual violence.  
III. Imposing a duty on commanders to take proactive measures:
The proposed standard is not strict liability. It would allow the accused persons to 
rebut the presumption by showing that they have taken affirmative measures to avert such 
violence.  In essence, this is a slight expansion of the duty requirement in the second non-
mental element of the crime: failure by the superior to halt, prevent, or punish the 
subordinate.  Most courts have interpreted this element to mean the superior has a duty 
“to prevent” the crime in that particular instance.  This note is suggesting that a 
commander has a general duty to prevent all wartime rapes in areas under his command.
This section proposes that courts expand this duty to require that commanders take 
affirmative steps to prevent the general commission of acts of rape by subordinates.  
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A. Precedent for the Duty
Critic and Scholar, Kelly Askin, has suggested that the ICTY’s decision in two 
key cases, Celebici and Kvocka : “can be used, inter alia, to hold superiors criminally 
liable for failing to adequately train, supervise, control or punish subordinates who 
commit rape crimes.”128 While I disagree with the ICTY’s interpretation of the mens rea 
standard in these cases, I do believe that the cases represent important precedent for an 
expanded commander duty. Although they use  different standards of liability, both cases 
imply that a commander has a duty to do more than simply “prevent” a particular violent 
act. The cases impliedly suggest that c ommanders might avoid liability by taking certain 
measures to show that they  have attempted to discourage such opportunistic sexual 
violence.
B. Celebici
The Celebici case is remarkable because it is the first case since World War II in 
which a Court found a war criminal guilty under the doctrine of command
responsibility.129  In May of 1992, Bosnian Serb forces took control of various Bosnian 
Muslim and Bosnian Croat villages located in central Bosnia and Herzegovina.130  The 
soldiers transported most of the men and some of the women to a prison camp in Celebici 
where they lived for a period of five months.131  During their five month incarceration, 
the women and men were “killed, tortured, sexually assaulted, beaten, and otherwise 
subjected to cruel and inhumane treatment.”132
128
 Askin, supra note 7, at 327.
129 See U.N. Judges Sentence Three for War Crimes Against Bosnian Serbs, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 17, 
1998, at A29. 
130 Celebici, Case No.IT-96-21-T, Initial indictment.
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The prosecution charged the four defendants, among other things, with raping two 
female prisoners in the Celebici prison camp.  All of the four accused held positions 
within the camp.  Esad Landzo was a guard at the camp, Zdravko Mucic and Hazim Delic 
acted as deputy commanders of the camp, while Zejnil Delalic had superior authority 
over the camp because of his position as coordinator of the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian 
Croat forces. 133 Mucic and Delalic were charged with superior responsibility over the 
Celebici camp for the acts of their subordinates, including rapes committed by Landzo 
and Delic.134
The Celebici Court considered the three elements of Article 7(3) of the ICTY 
statute as relevant to a finding of command responsibility.
(i) the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship;
(ii) the superior knew or had reason to know that the criminal act was about to be 
or had been committed; and
(iii) the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent 
the criminal act or punish the perpetrator thereof.
Ultimately, the ICTY accepted the Prosecution’s interpretation of Article (7)(3), noting 
that commanders with “power to prevent and punish the crimes” of their subordinates, 
may “under certain circumstances” incur liability for failing to do so.135  People in 
positions of influence, “whether civilian or within military structures,” can be held 
criminally liable under Article (7)(3) because of their “de facto as well as de jure
positions as superiors.”136  The Court further asserted that the “mere absence of legal 
authority” to control those subordinates would not preclude a finding of liability.137  The 
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Celebici, Case No.IT-96-21-T ¶ 354.
136 Id.
137 Id.
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superior must have “effective control” over those who have committed the crime and 
possess the “material ability to prevent and punish the commission of these offenses.”138.  
The ICTY also addressed the mental state necessary to make a finding of 
command responsibility under their statute.  The Court made clear that command 
responsibility is not a doctrine of strict liability, and does require proof of mental state. 
The superior can incur liability only when he “knew” or “had reason to know” that his 
subordinates had committed or were about to commit an illegal act.139  The ICTY
ultimately held that “inquiry notice” should be the standard used to determine a 
commander’s negligence (i.e., “had reason to know”).140 The information, itself, need 
not suggest that crimes had been committed or were about to be committed, but must 
indicate a need for additio nal investigation.141
The ICTY’s language is highly indicative of an affirmative duty on commanders 
to investigate and prevent rape.  The Court does not expressly clarify the type or quantity 
of information required to satisfy the element.  However, under the “inquiry notice” 
standard, the commander appears to have an affirmative duty to investigate any situation 
in which violence is taking place, and act to stop the violence.  As such, a commander 
might be able to avoid liability by showing he has taken specific steps, (i.e., investigating, 
reporting monitoring) to deter the acts of sexual violence, even during times of ethnic 
conflict and genocide.  
138 Id. at 378.
139 Id. at 383.
140 Id. at 393.
141 Id.
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C. Akayesu and the ICTR
Like the ICTY, the ICTR, has indicated that the negligence standard (“should 
have known”) is appropriate in cases of command responsibility. Akayesu142 involved 
allegations of incitement of a Rwandan local civilian official for the actions of others 
resulting in genocide against the Tutsi population residing in his commune. The ICTR 
Trial Chamber adduced that according to Rwandese law, Akayesu's position as 
“burgomaster” placed him as (1) the head of the communal administration; (2) the 
officier de l'état, and (3) the person responsible for maintaining and restoring the 
peace.143  This position was sufficient to establish Akayesu's authority, a necessary 
element of his conviction for the crime of genocide.  The Court held that it was irrelevant 
if the commander could prevent the crimes or not, where he didn’t attempt to do so.144
The modern treatment of command responsibility appears to be moving in the direction 
of imposing a duty on commanders to take measures to prevent the commission of 
heinous acts of violence, such as murder, rape, and torture.
B. Joint Criminal Enterprise as a mechanism for punishing commanders
In Kvocka145 decided only a few years after Celebici, the ICTY appeared to 
change course with regards to the proper mechanism for punishing military leaders.  In 
this case, the ICTY used the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise as a basis for superior 
liability.146 Joint criminal enterprise holds that an individual may incur liability “for all 
142 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No.ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, (Sept. 2, 1998)
143 Id. ¶ 318.
144 Id. ¶ 320.
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146 See Mark Osiel, Perspectives on Transnational Justice: Collective Memory, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J 793 
(suggesting that the ICTY has essentially made it to easy to prosecute people under the JCE theory because 
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crimes pursuant to the existence of a common plan or design which involves the 
commission of a crime provided for in the statute if the defendant participates with others 
in the common design.”147  The Tadic case, heard by the ICTY a few years earlier, held 
that the principle of Joint Criminal Enterprise was implicit in the Court’s Statute.148
In Kvocka, Prosecutors charged the accused with seventeen counts of crimes 
against humanity and violations of the wars or customs of law.149 The charges included 
murder, torture, beating, sexual assault and rape.150  Between April and August of 1992,
Bosnian Serb authorities forcibly moved Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats, and other 
non-Serbs from their homes in northwestern Bosnia to a prison camp named Omarska.151
Miroslav Kvocka was the first commander of the camp, and became the deputy 
commander in June of 1992.152  As deputy commander, he was in a position of authority 
superior to everyone in the camp other than the camp commander.  Dragoljub Prcac
replaced Miroslav Kvovka as deputy commander in June of 1992.153 Milojica Kos and 
Mladjo Radic acted as shift commanders, and when present at the camp, were in a 
position of superior authority to all camp personnel, other than the commander or deputy 
commander, and most visitors. 154
because it tightens the knowledge requirement and indicates even more powerfully than Celebici that 
commanders have a duty to take steps to prevent sexual violence.
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The Kvocka Court defined joint criminal enterprise as existing whenever “two or 
more people participate in a common criminal endeavor.”155  Liability arises when a 
person “knowingly participate[s] in the criminal endeavor, and [his] acts or omissions 
significantly assist or facilitate the commission of the crimes.”156  While knowledge is 
required, it need not be direct. Visitors to the Omarska camp would have seen the 
“bloodied, bruised, and injured bodies of the detainees, heard the screams and cries of 
pains and suffering, and smelled the deteriorating corpses and the urine and feces soiling 
the detainees’ clothes.”157  Accordingly, a participant in the joint criminal enterprise need 
not be an eye-witness to a crime, and could easily fulfill the knowledge requirement 
through his mere presence in the camp. The accused must have knowledge and have 
participated in the criminal activity, either through an affirmative act or by failing to 
act.158  The Court concluded that the Omarska Camp qualified as a joint criminal 
enterprise; “a facility used to interrogate and abuse those of non-Serbian descent.”159
The ICTY makes explicit that the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise casts a wide 
net.  Liability may attach for crimes that are a “natural and foreseeable” consequence of 
the enterprise.160  That is, assuming the camp’s purpose was merely to restrain prisoners,
“participants” in the enterprise might incur liability for acts of sexual violence occurring 
in the camp, even if they did not intend such acts.  The ICTY held that it would be 
illogical to “expect that none of the women held in Omarska, placed in circumstances 
rendering them especially vulnerable, would be subjected to rape or other forms of sexual 
155 Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30-T, ¶ 307.
156 Id. at 308.
157 Id. at 324.
158
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violence…[l]iability for foreseeable crimes flows to aiders and abettors as well as co-
perpetrators of the criminal enterprise.”161 The ICTY found the commanders vicariously
guilty of rape merely because they had been in the camp.  
When read in conjunction with Celebici, these cases strongly imply that military 
commanders have an implicit affirmative duty to take measures to prevent rape.  In 
addition, the language in Kvocka suggests that proof of knowledge is not an actual 
requirement; the Court essentially inferred knowledge. Accordingly, it is incumbent 
upon commanders to be able to show courts that they have taken steps to prevent rape if 
they have any hope of avoiding liability.
IV. Factors the Court may consider in determining whether leaders have 
successfully rebut the presumption:
As suggested earlier, this note is not suggesting strict liability.  It would be 
patently unfair to hold leaders liable who have made a good faith attempt to prepare for 
and prevent such gender-based violence.  The standard proposed would allow 
commanders to rebut the presumption by showing that they have taken reasonable steps 
to prevent rape.  While this standard will not work for rogue or insurgent groups, it would 
likely have a significant effect on state-sponsored military operations.  The measures 
outlined below are not a panacea, but may be factors a commander can use to rebut the 
presumption.
A. Training
Many governments and military bodies do not adequately train troops to avoid 
sexual violence.  In countries where troops receive little or no education about sexual 
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violence, the problem appears to run rampant. For example, during the nine-year conflict 
in Sierra Leone, soldiers repeatedly raped and abused thousands of women.162  A report 
by Human Rights Watch found that the Sierra Leonean army had established no specific
program to train any military or police force with regards to women’s rights and bodily 
integrity.163 This is particularly problematic in cultures where enemy women are
dehumanized.164  Young soldiers might think nothing of raping a woman in societies
where women have attained low peacetime status.165 An eighteen-year-old recruit whose 
society has indoctrinated him with such attitudes since birth, may not realize he is 
committing an illegal or immoral act.  Therefore, it is incumbent on adult commanders to 
educate soldiers about acceptable conduct in war.
Because wartime rape may be a product of a peacetime culture which denigrates 
women, it should be incumbent upon military commanders to take action before an armed 
conflict has arisen. In this way, new troops can slowly adjust to the notion that sexual
violence is unjust and immoral.  LaShawn Jefferson of Human Rights Watch, for 
example, has considered various methods that military personnel might use to deter 
wartime sexual violence.  He has suggested that National governments, the UN, civil 
society, and regional actors take action during peacetime to prevent the sexual violence 
that is virtually inevitable in times of armed conflict.166 Jefferson has proposed that
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better training of combatants is a necessary first step.167  While acknowledging that such 
increased training is unlikely to affect fringe rebel groups, he feels that it wil l “affect a 
core group of uninformed soldiers and officers under state authority.”168  These soldiers 
should receive “timely, clear, consistent, and regular training and reinforcement on the 
illegality and unacceptability of sexual violence in conflict.”169 I agree with Jefferson 
that military commanders should ensure that this training begins at the outset of the 
recruit’s formal training and continues periodically throughout the course of their 
relationship with the military.  State governments in connection with high-level military 
officials should work to develop and implement such a program as a prerequisite for all 
those seeking to join the military. Commanders must be responsible for ensuring that it 
occurs vigorously, properly and regularly.  
B. Monitoring, Reporting, & Intervention
While a well-orchestrated training program is of utmost importance, Courts
should also consider whether or not high-level military personnel have established a 
program to monitor acts of sexual violence. Such a program may require the hiring of 
specific agents trained to monitor and, perhaps, intervene in situations having the 
potential for sexual violence. Lower-level agents should be required to report acts of 
violence to higher level commanders, who should then take action to prevent or stop the 
sexual violence before it occurs (or stop it from reoccurring).  
In situations where commanders feel they are ill-equipped to prevent the violence, 
they should report the happenings to independent observer agencies such as the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR).  These groups can sometimes take 
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active measures to stop or reduce the violence. 170 For example, in Somali refugee 
camps, in Kenya, the UNCHR successfully diminished the number of rapes occurring in 
those camps by planting electric fences and thorn bushes around camp sites to protect 
women, offering human rights training to Kenyon police officers, and constructing a 
police post near the refugee camps.171
This note is not suggesting that a commander must engage in all of the above 
activities in order to avoid liability for rape crimes, but all are methods that might prove 
effective in the deterrence of rape.  Courts should consider these factors in determining if 
an accused commander has taken the steps to rebut the knowledge presumption.  While 
other methods may be just as useful in the deterrence of rape, evidence that commanders
have acted to properly train troops, established mandatory reporting procedures, and 
developed and implemented intervention strategies should be chief among a court’s 
considerations in deciding if the accused has successfully rebut the knowledge 
presumption.
V. How the ICC could use this standard to punish criminals in Darfur
The Rome Statute which created the ICC expands the mens rea requirement 
contained in the statutes of the ICTY and ICTR, and allows the court to consider
surrounding circumstances in reaching a decision about a commander’s knowledge.172
While it is impossible to predict how the ICC will interpret this language, it is preferable 
that they read it to allow general, historical knowledge of rape to satisfy the mental state
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requirement.  Such a reading would allow the ICC to more easily punish the military 
leaders who may be responsible for much of the violence in Darfur.
A. Sexual Violence and the Rome Statute
The Rome Statute gives the ICC broad jurisdiction over four major crimes: (1) the 
crime of genocide; (2) crimes against humanity; (3) war crimes; and (4) the crime of 
aggression.173 The ICC can prosecute rape as a crime against humanity (Article 7) or as 
war crime (under Article 8).  The Rome Statute enumerates the following crimes of 
sexual violence: rape, enforced prostitution, sexual slavery, forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilization, and other forms of sexual violence of comparable gravity.  This note is not 
suggesting that rape is the only gender-related crime that the ICC could punish under the 
proposed standard. It is, in fact, conceivable that the Court might choose to review other 
crimes under a similar standard.  Rape, however, is the most common form of sexual 
violence occurring in armed conflict.174 As this article has suggested, a plethora of 
evidence exists to show that rape has been an ongoing problem in war.  The other forms 
of sexual violence may be as prevalent as rape, but researchers have not produced enough 
evidence to support such an assertion.  The argument of this note hinges on the fact that
rape has historically been so obvious and widespread , that a commander must be aware 
of it.  The same evidence does not exist for the other forms of sexual violence 
enumerated in the Rome Statute.
B. Meaning of “time” in Article 28 of  the Rome Statute
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Under Article 28 of the Rome Statute:
(a) A military commander or person effectively acting as a military commander 
shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court 
committed by forces under his or her effective command and control, or effective 
authority and control as the case may be, as a result of his or her failure to 
exercise control properly over such forces, where: 
(i) That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the 
circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces were 
committing or about to commit such crimes; and 
(ii) That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and 
reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their 
commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for 
investigation and prosecution.
(b) With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described in 
paragraph (a), a superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court committed by subordinates under his or her effective 
authority and control, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly 
over such subordinates, where: 
(i) The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information 
which clearly indicated, that the subordinates were committing or about to 
commit such crimes; 
(ii) The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective 
responsibility and control of the superior; and 
(iii) The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures 
within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to 
submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and 
prosecution.
Article (7)3 of the ICTY’s Statute and Article (6)(3) of the ICTR’s Statute on command 
responsibility contain similar language to that found in Article 28 of the Rome Statute.  
All three statues contain the same mens rea language of “known” or “should have 
known.” While the Rome Statute uses the “knew” or “should have known” language, it
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qualifies this standard with the phrase “owing to the circumstances of the time.”  This 
important addition indicates that the ICC may presume some degree of knowledge.
A plain reading of the language indicates that the ICC can consider the 
environment and surrounding conditions during the period in which the rapes occurred in 
reaching a conclusion about the mental state of the accused.  Factors such as widespread
reporting of violence by the media, visibly violent conditions, or the presence of death 
camps might suggest that the commander should have known about the crimes.  
However, the ICC is free to interpret this language as encompassing a broader meaning. 
The noun form of the word “time” has at least fourteen different meanings, one of which 
is “an historic period.”175  Accordingly, the ICC may construe this word more broadly as 
meaning “the modern era” in which enemy soldiers have used rape in nearly every global
conflict to control and humiliate civilians.  Such an interpretation would enable the ICC 
to presume commander knowledge.  This reading has much greater potential to
effectively decrease the high incidence of wartime rape than the standard currently 
adopted by the ICTY. 
A. Applying this standard to Darfur
As indicated earlier in this note, the atrocities in Darfur are currently under 
investigation by ICC prosecutors.  It is likely that the ICC will try many of the military 
commanders involved in the conflict in the near future.  By all accounts, rape has been a 
component of nearly every attack in Darfur.176  Many of the soldiers committing the 
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crimes are government-backed Sudanese forces.177 Accordingly, the ICC will likely be 
considering rape in conjunction with command responsibility.  It is not yet clear whether 
government and military officials ordered the rapes.178 However, given that the conflict 
lasted for nearly two years and that rape was widely reported media outlets, it is difficult 
to imagine that leaders were unaware of the crimes.
Under the ICTY’s mens rea standard, it may be difficult to prove that 
commanders had knowledge of the attacks.  Military leaders in Darfur may not have been 
present at the crime scenes, and most likely did not physically perpetrate the crime.  
Therefore, should the ICC adopt the Celebici. standard, many military leaders might be 
able to avoid liability because no proof exists to either tie them to the crime scene or 
suggest that they ordered the rapes.  Leaders would merely need to “cover their tracks” 
(i.e., shred documents, hide communications, or avoid being present in areas of violence)
in order to avoid liability.  It would be patently unfair for these criminals t o avoid 
liability.  The ICC should use the standard this note has proposed to convict leaders who 
might otherwise go free under the Celebici standard.  
VI. Conclusion
The ICC has the power to change the course of history. The United Nations 
Security Council created the ICTY and ICTR as temporary courts meant to try only 
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specific geographically-restricted crimes.179 Unlike these tribunals, the ICC is a 
permanent freestanding court of justice180 and has jurisdiction to try many of the most 
serious and shocking crimes from all over the globe for years to come.181 One of the
most significant goals underlying the creation of the ICC was the deterrence of future 
crimes.182  Many of the countries who took part in the creation of the Court hope its 
message will be powerful enough to prevent potential criminals from committing these 
atrocious acts of violence.183  This goal was also implicit in the creation of the ICTY and 
ICTR.184  It may be impossible to know how much a deterrent effect these older tribunals
have actually had, but many have quietly acknowledged that it has been negligible.185
The violence in Darfur began less than a decade after the ICTR and ICTY issued formal 
judgments condemning many of the criminals in Bosnia and Rwanda.  It is readily 
apparent that the tribunals’ message has not been powerful to prevent the recurrence of 
such crimes.  
Because rape continues to destroy the lives of millions of women and girls across 
the globe, it is imperative that the ICC find novel ways of punishing rapists.  Article 28
gives the ICC wide latitude in punishing commanders who have allowed or secretly 
condoned the commission of rape by subordinates.  It is vital that the ICC punish these
leaders even when no evidence exists to link them to the crime scene, or show that they 
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ordered rape.  The ICC must send an unequivocal message to military leaders about their 
duty to ensure that soldiers adhere to proper conduct of war.  A war crimes tribunal that 
allows commander to avoid liability for the crimes of his subordinates has failed its 
mission.  The interpretation of command responsibility that this note has offered allows 
the ICC to hold commanders liable with or without evidence of knowledge because in 
fact this knowledge must exist given the current state of affairs.  This strict standard is
necessary if the ICC has any hope of ending at least some of the global violence against 
women. While it is unlikely that wartime rape will ever vanish, the ICC may be able to 
help many future generations of women to avoid the lifelong scars that modern warfare 
inflicts upon them.
